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THE EUROPEAN SECURITIESAND MARKETSAUTHORITY:
LIFTINGTHEVEIL ONTHEALLOCATION OF POWERS
PIERRE SCHAMMO*
1. Introduction
The year 2011 has proved to be a remarkable year for European financial
supervision. The beginning of the year saw the establishment of the European
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) as a response to the financial crisis
and the recommendations of the de Larosière group, a group of experts set up
by the Commission in 2008 in order to look into financial supervision.1 As
part of the establishment of the ESFS, three new European supervisory
authorities (ESA) were established in the banking, securities market, and
insurance and occupational pensions fields: the European BankingAuthority
(EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).2 They
were given greater responsibilities and tasks, and especially, they were
allocated real powers to exercise their tasks. This article focuses on one of
these authorities, ESMA, which replaced the Committee of European
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my sabbatical stay at the Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies (Keio University) in 2011. I
would like to thankKeioUniversity and especially Katsuhiro Shoji for his hospitality duringmy
stay.
1. The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, Report (2009), available at:
<ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf> (last visited 10
July 2011). The EU’s response to the financial crisis is examined in more detail in Moloney,
“EU financial market Regulation after the global financial crisis: ‘More Europe’ or more
risks?”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 1317–1383.
2. For first contributions on ESMA, see Fischer-Appelt, “The European securities and
markets authority: The beginnings of a powerful European securities authority?”, 1 Law and
Financial Markets Review (2011), 21–32; Schammo, EU Prospectus Law – New Perspectives
on Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets (CUP, 2011), pp. 28–54; Moloney, “The
European Securities and Markets Authority and institutional design for the EU financial
market –A tale of two competences: Part (1) rule-making”, 12EuropeanBusinessOrganization
Law Review (EBOR) (2011), 41–86; Ferran, “Understanding the new institutional architecture
of EU financial market supervision” (2011), available at: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1701147> (last visited 25 July 2011); Conac, “De CESR à l’ESMA: le
rubicon est franchi”, (2010) Bulletin Joly Bourse, 500–508; Moloney, “The European
Securities and Markets Authority and institutional design for the EU financial market – A tale
of two competences: Part (2) rules in action”, 12 EBOR (2011), 177–225.
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Securities Regulators (CESR) in January 2011. Like CESR, ESMA is a
collective securities actor.3 Its members are national authorities. They are the
voting members of the Board of Supervisors, the main decision-making organ
of ESMA,4which takes its decisions by simplemajority or qualifiedmajority.5
Besides the Board of Supervisors, ESMA has a full-time Chairperson and
Executive Director.6 A Management Board ensures inter alia that ESMA
carries out its mission and tasks.7 Its voting members are ESMA’s
Chairperson and six of the (voting) members of the Board of Supervisors
elected to the Management Board for a finite period.8
In contrast to CESR, ESMA is meant to have “real teeth”. To exercise its
tasks, it was, inter alia, given a greater say in shaping a European single
rulebook and allocated powers to take individual decisions. Moreover, it was
only recently given day-to-day supervisory powers over credit rating agencies.
The aim of this paper is to examine and assess ESMA’s powers. It starts by
noting that ESMA is not Europe’s single securities authority, with a place in
the Treaties next to other EU institutions. Instead, ESMA is a Union body (or
agency) which was created by way of a legislative act (the “ESMA
Regulation”).9 Crucially, ESMAwas delegated certain powers.This latter fact
raises some important issues which this paper attempts to investigate. Two
observations are central to the line of argument that the paper seeks to develop:
on the one hand, it is plain that the EU legislature has sought to manage the
allocation of powers to ESMA by adopting different strategies (e.g. by laying
down specific requirements which circumscribe the exercise of discretion); on
the other hand, EU actors have mostly been tight-lipped over the precise
constitutional limitations of a delegation of powers when allocating powers to
ESMA, thereby making it more difficult for any outside observer (e.g.
3. See on CESR and ESMA as collective actors, Schammo, op. cit. supra note 2.
4. Art. 40(1)(b) ESMA Reg. (Reg. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), of 24 November 2010, O.J. 2010,
331/84). Besides the heads of national public authorities in charge of supervising financial
actors (who are, as mentioned, voting members), the Board of Supervisors also includes a
number of non-voting members, i.e., its Chairperson, a Commission representative, a
representative of the European Systemic Risk Board and a representative of each of ESMA’s
sister agencies (the EIOPA and the EBA). See Art. 40(1) ESMA Reg.
5. Art. 44(1) ESMA Reg.
6. Arts. 48(1) and 51(1) ESMA Reg.
7. Art. 47(1) ESMA Reg.
8. Art. 45(1) and (2) ESMA Reg. The term of office for elected members is two-and-a-half
years. The Executive Director and a Commission representative can also attend meetings of the
Management Board (Art. 45(2) ESMA Reg). They have no voting rights, except that the
Commission representative can vote on budgetary matters referred to in Art. 63 of the ESMA
Reg.
9. Cited supra note 4.
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national parliaments) to verify whether the relevant principles are satisfied.10
Instead, the EU legislature has left us with the task of joining up the dots and
guessing its intentions when examining the provisions vesting powers in
ESMA. The argument of this article is that this state of affairs is not
satisfactory and should be addressed. Specifically, the article submits that EU
actors should be upfront in justifying compliance with the relevant
constitutional principles governing the delegation of powers when allocating
powers to ESMA, or for that matter, the ESAs.The article proceeds as follows.
Section 2 begins by examining the types of powers which ESMA was vested
with. Section 3 looks at the structure of ESMA’s powers and in this process
also discusses the case law on the delegation of powers. Section 4 highlights
various issues that the EU legislature has so far failed to address satisfactorily
when vesting powers in ESMA. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the
findings and making a few brief suggestions for the future.
2. ESMA’s powers
This section discusses ESMA’s powers. Instead of providing a detailed and
exhaustive list of powers,11 it differentiates between types of powers and
discusses how they testify, to different extents, to ESMA’s influence in the
securities field. Thus, the section begins by examining ESMA’s soft law
powers (2.1.), after which it turns to its preparatory rule-making powers (2.2.),
its intervention powers (2.3.) and finally, its day-to-day supervisory powers
(2.4.).
2.1. Soft law powers
One can be brief with respect to ESMA’s soft law powers, as they do not raise
particular questions for the present purposes. Article 16 of the ESMA
Regulation is the main provision. It provides for ESMA to produce guidelines
and recommendations, which it can address to competent authorities or
market actors. By definition, these measures are not binding on their
10. The silence surrounding the questions which the delegation to ESMA raises is all the
more disconcerting as EU actors have so far been unsuccessful in defining an overarching
framework governing the operation of agencies. See infra note 110.
11. At the time of writing, negotiations over vesting ESMA with new powers are ongoing.
See e.g, Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, COM(2010)484 final;
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on short
selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, COM(2010)482 final. Proposed powers are
not examined here.
ESMA 1881
addressees. Having said this, the ESMA Regulation nevertheless seeks to
make it more difficult for their addressees to simply ignore them. Thus, the
Regulation provides that competent authorities or market actors “shall make
every effort to comply…” and requires competent authorities to disclose
whether they comply, or at least intend to comply, with the measures in
question.12 If a competent authority does not comply or does not intend to do
so, it must give reasons.13 ESMAmust in turn publish this fact.14 It might also
make public the reasons given by the authority for failing to comply.15 Note
that market actors can also be required to report on whether they comply,
provided that they are required to do so by the guideline or recommendation.16
Finally, ESMA will have to identify the competent authorities which have
failed to comply in its annual report.17 In this context,Article 16 puts a certain
onus on ESMA, as it provides that it must state how it will ensure that the
competent authorities in question will follow its guidelines and
recommendations in the future.18
2.2. Preparatory rule-making powers
Before examining ESMA’s preparatory rule-making powers, it is worth
briefly stepping back for a moment. In 2001, one of the core questions for the
Lamfalussy group, a group of experts established by the Commission, was
how to improve the EU’s regulatory process in the securities field.19 For the
expert group, part of the answer was to rely to a greater extent on comitology
decision-making. In other words, while the EU legislature would adopt
legislative measures, more detail was supposed to be adopted through
implementing measures.20 In this process, CESR was only given a limited
role: the decision establishing CESR provided for it to assist the Commission
in an independent advisory capacity.21 Ten years later, the picture looks





17. Art. 16(4) ESMA Reg.
18. Ibid.
19. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities
Markets (Brussels, 15 Feb. 2001), available at: <ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/
lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf> (last visited 10 July 2011).
20. Given that implementing measures were adopted through a comitology procedure, the
Commission established the European Securities Committee, a group ofMember State officials
chaired by the Commission, as the relevant comitology committee.
21. Arts. 1 and 2 of Commission Decision of 23 Jan. 2009 establishing the Committee of
European Securities Regulators, O.J. 2009, L 25/18 (repealed).
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significantly different. Following the establishment of the ESFS at the
beginning of 2011 and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,
ESMA was given the central role in preparing so-called draft technical
standards. Under the ESMA Regulation, these draft standards are meant to be
adopted by the Commission, either in the form of delegated acts (regulatory
technical standards or RTS) or implementing acts (implementing technical
standards or ITS).22 Technical standards are part of the EU’s effort to create a
single rule-book and are supposed to contribute to ensuring a level playing
field between Member States. As the author of the draft standards, ESMA’s
influence over their content is utmost. Indeed, in contrast to its predecessor,
ESMA’s input will be direct and unmediated at the drafting stage.23
Nonetheless, there is a clear boundary that the EU legislature did not cross
when laying down the provisions on the RTS and ITS. ESMAcan only develop
draft standards. As already mentioned, for the standards to be binding, the
European Commission is required to endorse them.24 First, however, it can
amend them; it can endorse them only in part or it can turn them down, as long
as it complies with the requirements of the ESMA Regulation.25 Whilst the
Commission has thus the power of final say underArticles 10 and 15, a couple
of (non-binding) recitals suggest nevertheless that the Commission will
exercise its powers with some restraint. In relation to draft RTS, Recital 23
states that the draft standards should only be amended in a limited number of
cases.26Meanwhile, Recital 24 records the Commission’s intention to “rely, as
a rule, on the draft regulatory standards submitted to it…”.
The Commission has expressed some grievances about its role, and by
implication, ESMA’s role, under the provisions on technical standards.
Besides vesting ESMA with the role of drafting the standards, the provisions
of the ESMA Regulation lay down precise requirements regarding the way in
which the Commission and ESMA must interact when the Commission does
not just simply intend to endorse the draft standards in full (e.g., because it
22. Arts. 10 and 15 ESMA Reg.
23. To ensure the necessary stakeholder input, ESMAwill be required to consult the public
and the Securities andMarkets Stakeholder Group, and also assess the costs and benefits which
might be involved. See Arts. 10(1) and 15(1) ESMA Reg. Note that ESMA may be exempted
from carrying out public consultations and cost-benefit assessments in certain circumstances
(see ibid.).
24. The precise procedure and the role of each actor is detailed in the ESMAReg. SeeArts.
10 and 15 ESMA Reg.
25. Indeed, in specific circumstances, it can adopt technical standards without an ESMA
draft. See infra note 27.
26. Recital 23 ESMA Reg states that “[d]raft regulatory technical standards would be
subject to amendment if they were incompatible with Union law, did not respect the principle of
proportionality or ran counter to the fundamental principles of the internal market for financial
services as reflected in the acquis of Union financial services legislation”.
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wants to amend them) or, in exceptional circumstances, where it seeks to adopt
technical standards without an ESMA draft.27 Given these rules and ESMA’s
involvement in drafting the standards, the Regulation’s arrangements have
raised concerns as to whether they are fully compatible with the Treaty
provisions on delegated and implementing acts. As a reminder, Article 290
TFEU allows the EU legislature to confer on the Commission powers to adopt
delegated acts. Article 291 provides for the Commission to be vested in a
legally binding act with implementing powers “[w]here uniform conditions
for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed”.28 From the
Commission’s point of view, the rules on technical standards unduly affect its
role. Article 290 TFEU does not, for instance, say anything about the
procedure according to which the Commission is meant to adopt a delegated
act.29 The Commission has accordingly concluded that it enjoyed “a large
measure of autonomy” with regard to the procedure for adopting delegated
acts.30 The Commission’s misgivings about the ESMA Regulation rules on
technical standards were expressed in a statement for the Council minutes
made at the adoption of ESMA’s text. The Commission noted that it had
“serious doubts whether the restrictions on its role when adopting delegated
acts and implementing measures are in line with articles 290 and 291
TFEU”.31 This position has received support in the literature. Chamon agrees
with the Commission’s assessment, noting that the provisions for the adoption
of the draft standards under the ESMA Regulation are difficult to reconcile
with the wording of the Treaties’ articles.32
There is, however, another issue with regard to the arrangements on
technical standards. It has to do with the constitutional limitations to a
delegation of powers. The next sections will spend time and effort on
27. Art. 10(1), (2) and (3) and Art. 15(1), (2) and (3) ESMA Reg. See also Art. 14 ESMA
Reg. Note the special requirements which apply where the Commission seeks to adopt RTS or
ITS without ESMA’s input. It presupposes, inter alia, that ESMA has failed to submit draft
standardswithin the specified time limits (seeArts. 10(3) and 15(3) andRecital 24 ESMAReg).
28. Art. 291(2) TFEU. In some cases, the Council can also be entrusted with the power to
adopt implementing acts (see ibid.).
29. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council – Implementation of Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, COM(2009)673 final, p. 6.
30. Ibid.
31. Council of the European Union, Statements, 15649/10 ADD 1, 10 Nov. 2010.
32. Chamon, “EU agencies between Meroni and Romano or the devil and the deep blue
sea”, 48CMLRev. (2011), 1055–1075, 1068–1070. It is fair to say thatArts. 290 and 291TFEU
are institutionally sensitive. As far as control mechanisms are concerned, the European
Parliament has, for instance, been keen to stress thatArt. 290 TFEU – in particular, Art. 290(2)
TFEU – did not state exhaustively the mechanisms which the EU legislature could use in order
to control a delegation of powers (see European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on the
powers of legislative delegation, A7-0110/2010, para 2.).
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examining the delegation of powers to ESMA. For reasons that will be
discussed hereinafter, a delegation of decision-making powers to EU bodies
such as ESMA faces important limitations. It is already worth mentioning that
in order to deal with such limitations, the EU legislature might consider
vesting the power to take decisions in the Commission. But such an
arrangement presupposes that the Commission’s power – in our case, the
power to endorse draft technical standards – has real substance. There is room
for argument about whether this is the case.33What seems clear at this juncture
is that a legally binding requirement which would have prevented the
Commission from forming its own views on the draft standards submitted to it
by ESMAwould have been a step too far. It would have crossed the bottom line
by making the endorsement process a mere formality. It would not have been
lawful.
2.3. Intervention powers
Besides its preparatory rule-making powers, ESMA possesses various
intervention powers. Intervention powers allow ESMA to intervene in certain
defined circumstances in the relationship between (national) competent
authorities, or in the relationship between competent authorities and market
actors. ESMA possesses such powers in order to settle disputes between
authorities.34 The ESMA Regulation makes indeed provision for ESMA to
assist competent authorities in resolving their disputes.35 But if competent
authorities fail to settle their disagreement, it also empowers ESMA to resolve
the dispute unilaterally by instructing the relevant authorities to take, or
abstain from, an action in order to resolve the matter.36 ESMA’s decision is
meant to ensure compliance with EU law.37 It will be binding.38 Moreover, if
a competent authority refuses to comply with its decision, ESMA’s
intervention powers will extend to a market actor that fails to comply with
directly applicable EU law requirements as a result of the behaviour of the
competent authority.39 Specifically, it will be entitled to address an individual
33. Cf. e.g. Chamon, op. cit. supra note 32, 1070, who doubts that the Commission’s power
of approval is in line with the Court’sMeroni decision; Schammo, op. cit. supra note 2, 44 who
takes a more optimistic view on the matter.
34. Art. 19 ESMA Reg.
35. Art. 19(1) and (2) ESMA Reg.
36. Art. 19(3) ESMA Reg.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Art. 19(4) ESMA Reg. Specifically, ESMA can take action “where a competent
authority does not comply with the decision of the Authority, and thereby fails to ensure that a
financial market participant complies with requirements directly applicable to it by virtue of the
acts referred to in Article 1(2) [of the ESMA Reg]”.
ESMA 1885
40 ESMA has on breaches of
EU law. The ESMA
situation.41 The purpose of ESMA’s intervention is to ensure that the market
actor in question complies with its EU law obligations, notwithstanding the
failings of the competent authority.42 Other intervention powers are available
in the case of an emergency situation.43 ESMA can, for instance, instruct
competent authorities to take action.44 It presupposes, however, that political
leaders in the Council agree on the existence of an emergency situation and
that there is a need for coordinated action.45 In certain circumstances, ESMA
will also be able to address an individual decision to a market actor in order to
instruct it to comply with relevant (and directly applicable) EU law
requirements.46 The conditions that must be met in such a case are somewhat
convoluted. It is presupposed, inter alia, that a competent authority, which
ESMA has asked to take action, fails to comply with ESMA’s decision.47
Finally, ESMA’s intervention powers also include the power to ban, or restrict,
for a limited period of time “financial activities that threaten the orderly
functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or
part of the financial system in the Union”,48 if provision is made for this in
40. Ibid.
41. Art. 17(6) ESMA Reg. For ESMA to take action, the Regulation states that it must be
necessary to address in a “timely manner” the competent authority’s failure to comply with the
Commission’s formal opinion “in order tomaintain or restore neutral conditions of competition
in the market or ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of the financial system” (ibid.).
42. Ibid.
43. Art. 18 ESMA Reg.
44. Art. 18(3) ESMA Reg.
45. Ibid., specifically, coordination must be necessary in order to deal with “adverse
developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial
markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union” (ibid.).
ESMA’s decision which requires competent authorities to take action is then meant to “address
any such developments…” (ibid.).
46. Art. 18(4) ESMA Reg.
47. Ibid.The Regulation states further that ESMA’s intervention will only be warranted “in
situations in which a competent authority does not apply the legislative acts referred to in
Article 1(2), including regulatory technical standards and implementing technical standards
adopted in accordance with those acts, or applies them in a way which appears to be a manifest
breach of those acts, andwhere urgent remedying is necessary to restore the orderly functioning
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in
the Union” (ibid.).
48. Art. 9(5) ESMA Reg.
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decision actor in question, instructing it to comply with these
obligations.
to the market
similar powers under the provisions
Regulation empowers it to address an individual decision to
a market actor whose competent authority, having been deemed not to comply
with EUlaw, fails to act onaCommission opinion which requires it to redress this
relevant legislative acts49 or if such action is required in an emergency
situation (and subject to the provisions on emergency situations of the ESMA
Regulation).50
Some of the above powers proved to be controversial. The EU legislature
agreed as a result to put in place additional arrangements in order to deal with
cases where ESMA decides to settle a dispute between competent authorities,
or where it instructs competent authorities to take action in the case of an
emergency situation.51 These arrangements allow the Council, if a Member
State alleges that its “fiscal responsibility” is affected, to have the final say on
a decision taken by ESMA against a competent authority.52 But despite these
safeguards, ESMA’s intervention powers are significant. They will allow it to
intervene in supervisory matters; for example when instructing a competent
authority to carry out a specific action in order to deal with a disagreement
(e.g. in order to ensure that authorities cooperate properlywith each other53) or
by intervening more directly in the relationship between supervisor and
supervisee, when exercising its power to issue an individual decision against a
market actor.
2.4. Day-to-day supervisory powers
The question of whether a single collective body such as ESMA should be
vested with day-to-day decision-making powers over market actors (thereby
replacing national competent authorities) has not been without controversy. It
remains exceptional, as it derogates from one of the premises of the ESFS
which is that day-to-day supervision is a matter for Member State
authorities.54 Supervision is generally based on the principles of home
country control, which determines the authority competent to ensure
supervision, and mutual recognition, which requires host State authorities to
recognize the supervisory decisions of the home State authority. Supervision
is not a defined term under the ESMARegulation. It appears to be used rather
loosely at EU level. It will be used hereinafter to describe the tasks of national
49. Ibid. More specifically, provision must be made for this in the legislative acts that are
referred to in Art. 1(2) of the ESMA Reg.
50. Ibid.
51. Art. 38(2) and (3).
52. Ibid. For the avoidance of doubt, ESMA’s decisions are subject to judicial review. See
Art. 61.
53. E.g., Art. 22(2) Directive 2003/71/EC, O.J. 2003, L 345/64 (as amended by Directive
2010/78/EU, O.J. 2010, L 331/120).
54. Recital (9) ESMA Reg.
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authorities which have to do with the application of rules and regulations to
particular instances (e.g. oversight, licensing or even enforcement).55
The debate on whether supervisory powers should be centralized had
different stages. CESR raised the question in 2004 in relation to
“trans-European market infrastructures”, without however reaching any
conclusion.56 In the wake of the financial crisis, proposals in favour of
centralizing certain decision-making powers were put forward by the de
Larosière group.57 It concluded that there was a case for centralizing
competences such as licensing and supervision for specific “EU-Wide
institutions, such as Credit Rating Agencies and post-trading
infrastructures”.58 The Commission was also in favour of granting the ESAs
supervisory powers over “certain entities with pan-European reach”.59
Amongst Member States, the UK was keen to restrict areas of EU
supervision.60 But for credit rating agencies (CRAs), agreement was reached
on vesting ESMA with supervisory powers.61 Given that CRAs are the first
type of entities which are subject to ESMA’s day-to-day supervision, the
relevant rules and provisions are worth examining in more detail.
ESMA’s powers with respect to CRAs are found in Regulation 1060/2009
on credit rating agencies (CRA-R),62 after it was amended by Regulation
513/2011 (CRA-AR).63 Following the adoption of the latter, the CRA-R now
entrusts ESMA with significant powers. Among them is the power to register
EU-based CRAs.64 The registration system that the Regulation establishes is
55. Cf. Wymeersch, “The structure of financial supervision in Europe: About single
financial supervisors, twin peaks and multiple financial supervisors”, 8 EBOR (2007),
237-306, 242 referring in the context of his paper to “supervision” as dealing with “applying
the rules to a specific case”.
56. CESR/04-333f, p. 17.
57. The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, Report (2009), op. cit. supra
note 1.
58. Ibid., p. 53.
59. E.g. Communication from the Commission: European financial supervision,
COM(2009)252 final, p. 11.
60. See e.g. EurActiv.com, “EU leaders back financial supervision overhaul” (19 June
2009), available at: <www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/eu-leaders-back-financial-
supervision-overhaul/article-183341> (last visited 15 July 2011).
61. Recital 5 ESMA Reg. The powers were enacted in the CRA-AR (see infra text to note
62). Negotiations in other fields are ongoing (e.g., on ESMA’s role with respect to trade
repositories).
62. Regulation No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (CRA-R), O.J. 2009, L 302/1. The
CRA-R, as originally adopted, is examined in Amtenbrink and De Haan, “Regulating credit
ratings in the European Union: a critical first assessment of Regulation 1060/2009 on credit
rating agencies”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1915–1949.
63. Regulation No 513/2011 (CRA-AR), O.J. 2011, L 145/30.
64. Arts. 14–17 CRA-R. Registration applies to CRAs which are legal persons established
in the EU (Art. 14(1) CRA-R). Art. 3(1)(b) CRA-R defines a CRA as “a legal person whose
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akin to a sort of licensing system, but with a particularity. Article 4(1) of the
CRA-R makes registration a requirement for ratings to be used by certain
market actors. Specifically, Article 4(1) states that credit institutions,
investment firms, insurance undertakings, assurance undertakings,
reinsurance undertakings, UCITS, institutions for occupational retirement
provision and alternative investment funds may use credit ratings for
“regulatory purposes” – i.e. for the purposes of complying with EU law65 –
only if the ratings are given by a CRA established in the EU and which is
registered according to the requirements of the CRA-R.66 ESMA’s powers
also extend to third-country CRAs. The Regulation lays down special
arrangements in order for credit ratings issued in a third-country to be used in
the EU.67 One such arrangement is for a third-country CRA to apply for
certification.68 Certification presupposes that a number of conditions are met,
including that the third-country CRA is authorized/registered at home, where
it must also be subject to supervision; that cooperation arrangements between
ESMA and the relevant third-country authorities are operational; and that the
credit ratings of the CRA and its credit rating activities are deemed
systemically unimportant “to the financial stability or integrity of the
financial markets of one or moreMember States”.69 In addition, a decision on
the equivalence of the “legal and supervisory framework” of the third country
must have been taken.70 This decision – i.e., the decision that recognizes
equivalence – is for the Commission to make.71 On the other hand, the power
to issue the certification decision belongs to ESMA, which will decide after
being satisfied that the relevant requirements are met.72
ESMA is also in charge of making sure that the CRA-R is properly
applied.73 It has powers to request information and to investigate74 and, if
necessary, it is empowered to sanction CRAs.75 Sanctioning powers include
supervisorymeasures such as the power to revoke a registration; to stop aCRA
occupation includes the issuing of credit ratings on a professional basis”. Note that ESMA is
also competent to certify third-country CRAs (see infra for details).
65. Art. 3(1)(g) CRA-R.
66. Art. 4(1) CRA-R.
67. Art. 4(3)-(6) and Art. 5 CRA-R.
68. Endorsement by an EU CRA of the credit rating issued outside the EU is another
arrangement, but which I do not examine here. For details, see Art. 4(3)-(6) CRA-R.
69. Art. 5(1)(a), (c) and (d) CRA-R.
70. Art. 5(1)(b) CRA-R.
71. Ibid., and Art. 5(6) CRA-R.
72. Art. 5(3) CRA-R.
73. Art. 21 CRA-R.
74. Arts. 23b, 23c and 23d CRA-R. Note that the CRA-R also grants ESMA the exclusive
power to enter into cooperation arrangements on information exchange with third country
authorities (Recital (6) CRA-AR; Art. 34 CRA-R, as amended).
75. Arts. 24, 36a and 36b CRA-R.
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from issuing ratings for a limited period of time; to suspend the use of ratings
for regulatory purposes; to instruct a CRA to put an end to an infringement;
and tomake public notices.76 Particularly noteworthy are the provisions which
grant ESMA the power to impose fines and penalty payments.77 By vesting
ESMA with such a power, the CRA-AR broke new ground on the delegation
of tasks to agencies. There will be more to say about these powers in the next
section. For now, it is worth concluding by noting that the powers which
ESMA was granted by the CRA-AR contribute importantly to placing it
among the most powerful agencies in the EU. Indeed, powers which were
previously in the hands of national authorities are now concentrated in the
hands of a single EU body. That said, Member State authorities will continue
to be involved in some way or another, for example because they are members
of ESMA, or because they might have been delegated tasks by ESMA,78 or
because they are in charge of supervising the users of credit ratings.79
3. The structure of ESMA’s powers
The previous section examined the various types of powers that are vested in
ESMA. This section assesses the structure of ESMA’s powers. For ESMA to
exercise its powers, it must have been granted such powers. The section
therefore begins by examining the way in which ESMA is allocated powers
(3.1.). Next, it discusses questions surrounding the delegation of powers
(3.2.). Finally, it will examine various strategies which the EU legislature
appears to have adopted in order to manage the allocation of powers to ESMA
and thereby make it constitutionally and/or politically acceptable (3.3.).
3.1. Allocation of powers
ESMA is allocated powers in its founding Regulation. Article 1(2) of the
Regulation states that ESMA “shall act within the powers conferred by [the
ESMA Regulation]”. Still, the manner in which the EU legislature conferred
powers on ESMA is more complicated than the quoted passage ofArticle 1(2)
appears to suggest. First, the founding Regulation does not allocate ESMA all
its powers. We have already seen that it is also granted powers in sectoral
76. Art. 24(1) CRA-R.
77. Arts. 36a and 36b CRA-R.
78. Art. 30 CRA-R.
79. According to Art. 25a of the CRA-R “sectoral competent authorities shall be
responsible for the supervision and enforcement of Article 4(1)…”. See also Recital (9)
CRA-AR.
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legislation (i.e. the CRA-AR).80 Second, in order to determinewhether ESMA
has the necessary powers to take action, it will often be necessary to have
regard to sectoral acts. Indeed, according toArticle 1(2), ESMAmust not only
act within the powers vested in it in the ESMARegulation, but also “within the
scope” of various acts (e.g. the Prospectus Directive, the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive, etc.) including subordinate measures, and “any further
legally binding Union act which confers tasks on [ESMA]”.81 These acts
might elaborate on a given power: for instance, by specifying its scope or by
determining the areas in which ESMA can exercise its powers. Thus, for
ESMA to exercise its power to prepare draft RTS or ITS, sectoral acts will
need to specify the areas which can be dealt with through the adoption of
technical standards.82 For dispute settlement, sectoral legislation will be
required to define the cases which qualify for this procedure (e.g. matters
which involve obligations for competent authorities to cooperate, to exchange
information or to take joint decisions).83When relying on sectoral acts in order
to elaborate on the powers which ESMA was given in the ESMA Regulation
(instead of just allocating open-ended powers to ESMA in its founding
Regulation), ESMA’s power to intervene will effectively depend on a
two-stage process. Arguably, this also allows the EU legislature to control
ESMA’s competences more tightly, as it progresses with its efforts to
re-regulate financial markets. Note that in order to make this systemwork, the
legislature has so far adopted one so-called “omnibus” directive whose
purpose is to amend existing legislative acts.84 A second directive is being
negotiated at the time of writing.
80. See alsoArt. 8(1)(j) ESMAReg. which provides for ESMA to “fulfil any other specific
tasks set out in this Regulation or in other legislative acts”. It is worth noting that the
Commission proposal on the ESMA Reg. included a provision which stated that ESMA could
through sectoral legislation be entrusted with exclusive supervisory powers over certain market
actors, or activities, with EU wide reach (COM(2009)503, Art. 6(3)). This provision did not,
however, make it into the legally binding text of the ESMA Reg. When referring to the powers
which ESMA possesses in order to “achieve” its tasks, Art. 8(2) ESMA Reg only provides (in
line with Art. 1(2) ESMA Reg)., for ESMA “to have the powers set out in this Regulation…”.
But at any rate, the ESMAReg. indicates that the EU legislature did not intend for all powers to
have an express legal basis in the Regulation. ESMA’s day-to-day supervisory powers over
CRAs are, for instance, only foreseen in the recitals (Recital 5 ESMA Reg).
81. See also in this contextArt. 1(3) ESMA Reg. which further specifies ESMA’s scope of
action.
82. Arts. 10(1) and 15(1) ESMA Reg.
83. Art. 19(1) ESMA Reg.
84. Directive 2010/78/EU, O.J. 2010, L 331/120.
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3.2. Delegation of powers
The assessment of ESMA’s powers is also complicated by the fact that ESMA
and its sister authorities, the EBA and EIOPA, are not EU institutions which
exist under the Treaties and which have powers vested in them directly by the
Treaties. Instead, the ESAs are EU bodies (or EU agencies) which are
delegated certain powers. The question of the structure of ESMA’s powers
must therefore also be discussed in light of the principles governing the
delegation of powers to outside bodies, especially the Court’s Meroni
judgment.85 There are at least two aspects of this decision which are worthy of
closer examination. The first, much cited, aspect of Meroni regards the
delegation of discretionary powers and more specifically the Court’s decision
that delegating a “discretionary power, implying a wide margin of
discretion”86 was not permissible.87 Thus, a delegation could only involve
“clearly defined executive powers”.88 To justify its decision, the Court
highlighted the fact that the delegation of discretionary powers would
undermine the balance of powers “characteristic of the institutional structure
of the Community”.89An equally important aspect ofMeroniwas the Court’s
ruling that a lawful delegation presupposed that the delegator did not delegate
powers which were different from its own powers.90 Thus the fact that in
Meroni, the delegatees’ decisions were exempted from conditions that would
have applied if the powers had been exercised by the delegator, meant that the
delegation in question was not permissible.91Meroni is admittedly not the sole
case that has attracted attention. The Court’s decision in Romano is also cited
in discussions on the delegation of powers.92 In Romano, the Court decided
that a body known as the Administrative Commission of the European
Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers, could not be
empowered to adopt acts “having the force of law” (“revêtant un caractère
85. Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, [1958] ECR 133.
86. Ibid., p. 152.
87. Specifically the Court referred to discretionary powers “implying a wide margin of
discretion which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of
actual economic policy” (ibid).
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 152. In the Court’s case law, the notion of “institutional balance” concerns the
division of powers between institutions and requires each institution “to exercise its powers with
due regard for the powers of the other institutions”. See Case C-70/88, European Parliament v.
Council, [1990] ECR I-2041, para 22. Note that according to Jacqué, Meroni was the “first
genuine reference to the institutional balance”. See Jacqué, “The principle of institutional
balance”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 383-391, 384.
90. Meroni, cited supra note 85, para 150.
91. Ibid.
92. Case 98/80, Romano v. Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité, [1981] ECR
1241. For a detailed assessment of Romano, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note 32.
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normative”).93 Thus, according to the Court, a decision of the Administrative
Commission could not be of such as nature as to require authorities to observe
“certain methods or adopt certain interpretations” when applying Community
legislation.94
While the Court’s ruling in Romano is important, it is fair to say that it has
not been the main influence on discussions regarding the delegation of
powers.95 Indeed, it isMeroniwhich mainly continues to shape debates on the
delegation of powers. This is so despite the fact that it is an old decision which
concerned a Community and a Treaty (i.e. the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) and the Treaty establishing it) which no longer exist.
There has been admittedly a debate in the academic community about the
relevance of Meroni for the EU.96 The literature has made a number of
arguments against applyingMeroni in the context of agencies. Critics have, for
example, argued that it does not make sense to applyMeroni in the EU context
which is different from its original context (i.e. the ECSC).97 Some fail to see
the appeal of the Meroni reasoning and argue that little will be lost if policy
makers delegate discretionary powers in fields in which there is a clear
overreaching objective, such as air safety, given that outcomes will be “close
to those preferred by legislators…”.98 Other critics have pointed out that, in
contrast to the scenario in Meroni, agencies are often vested with powers
which were previously in the hands of national authorities. That being so, they
argue that the idea of a delegation in theMeroni sense is not well suited to deal
with cases involving agencies.99
93. Ibid., para 20. See also Case C-102/91, Knoch v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, [1992] ECR
I-04341, para 52; Case 21/87, Borowitz v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte, [1988]
ECR 3715, para 19.
94. Romano, ibid., para 20. See also Knoch, ibid., para 52.
95. Chamon, op. cit. supra note 32, 1060.
96. E.g. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU law and the transformation of European governance” in
Joerges and Dehousse (Eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP 2002),
pp. 207–229; Gerardin, “The development of European regulatory agencies: What the EU
should learn from American experience”, 11 CJEL (2005), 1–52; Yataganas, “Delegation of
regulatory authority in the European Union”, (2001) Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/01;
Schneider, “A common framework for decentralized EU agencies and theMeroni doctrine”, 61
Administrative Law Review (2009), 29–44; Chamon, “EU agencies: Does the Meroni doctrine
make sense?”, 17 MJ (2010), 281–305; Griller and Orator, “Everything under control? The
‘way forward’ for European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine”, 35 EL Rev.
(2010), 3–35.
97. E.g. Gerardin, op. cit. supra note 96, 10.
98. Yataganas, op. cit. supra note 96.
99. Dehousse, op. cit. supra note 96, p. 221. See also Gerardin, op. cit. supra note 96, 10.
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Yet, despite its critics, it is submitted that the Court’s reasoning inMeroni is
relevant to the EU.100 Although the restrictions which it establishes with
respect to the delegation of discretionary powers are as a practical matter
problematic, its core messages – i.e. a delegation must involve powers which
a delegator possesses and that the institutional balance of powers must be
respected101 – are convincing in a sui generis system such as the EU which is
based on limited powers and in which the principle of the institutional balance
is upheld by the Court of Justice and helps to keep the political ambitions of
each EU institution in check. Moreover, unlike other fields such as air
transport where a clear overriding objective dominates (i.e. air safety),
securities regulation can have competing objectives (e.g. retail investor
protection, facilitating access to markets for companies, etc.) and Member
States can have very different relative preferences for these objectives. Indeed,
even if Member States agree on the importance of a specific objective, they
might still disagree on how to pursue it. Critics also arguably go too far when
claiming thatMeroni has nothing to offer in an EU context because agencies
are often vested with powers which were previously exercised at national
level.102 Indeed, it might just as well be said thatMeroni has something to offer
in this context because it established that a delegator could not delegate powers
which were different from its own.More fundamentally, however, the problem
with vertical situations is not whether the competence was previously
exercised at national level – after all, most competences were at some point
exercised at Member State level – but whether the EU and its institutions have
a legitimate claim to the competence in question. If yes, the competence may
be attributed to the EU and the institutional balance must be respected, as
otherwise one could easily bypass the principle of the institutional balance by
using secondary acts to vest binding powers in agencies.103
100. The present author has taken this view elsewhere, but without elaborating on the point.
See Schammo, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 32.
101. This is not to say that the notion of institutional balance has not continued developing
in the Court’s case law, starting fromMeroni. See Jacqué, op. cit., supra note 89, 384. See also
Lenaerts and Verhoeven, which derive fromMeroni one of three principles of the Court’s case
law on the institutional balance. See Lenaerts and Verhoeven, “Institutional balance as a
guarantee for EU governance” in Joerges and Dehousse, op. cit. supra note 96, p. 44. For a
contribution that insists on a static reading of the balance-of-power notion in Meroni, in order
to ultimately question the relevance of the decision for the EU, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note
96.
102. See also Schneider, op. cit. supra note 96, 37–38 who is not convinced by this
argument either.
103. See also ibid., noting that “…any form of direct implementation of EC-EU law by
EC-EU agencies requires at least a virtual implementation competence of the Commission or
other first-tier EU organs…Thus, one cannot circumvent the problem of institutional balance at
the EC-EU level”.
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One can arguably also take issue with other arguments, such as, for
example, that the limitations which Meroni places on the delegation of
discretionary powers is not warranted if an agency’s decisions are subject to
review by a court.104 For one thing, judicial intervention will not be automatic.
A court’s review may also be limited.105 Moreover, a court’s role of judicial
review and the role of oversight of a delegator should be kept separate. Relying
exclusively on a court would arguably mean that the court no longer just
exercises its power of judicial review, but also substitutes for the role of the
delegator.
This overview of different arguments is not intended to be exhaustive. It
should nevertheless be sufficient to establish that unless the Court intervenes
and decides to abandon its Meroni case law, it ought to be relevant in an EU
context. Moreover, even if the Court were to abandon Meroni, it would still
need to clarify its position on, and how its Meroni reasoning relates to, later
decisions such as Romano in which the Court did not refer to Meroni when
setting restrictions on what the Administrative Commission was entitled to
do.106 For now however – and even if one finds the decision impractical –
Meroni continues to be cited by the Court,107 and by political actors, as shown
by the negotiations over the ESAs and their powers.108 But what is
increasingly unsettling is that, save for brief references to Meroni in
104. See Art. 263 TFEU; Art. 61 ESMA Reg.
105. See also Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2006), p. 186 (noting that “[t]here
are…limits to the extent to which judicial review can be used to hold the content of
discretionary policy choices involving the balancing of public interests accountable”).
106. See supra text to notes 92–94.
107. E.g. Joined Cases C-154 & 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health, [2005] ECR I-6451,
para 90; Case C-301/02 P, Tralli, [2005] ECR I-4071, para 41. Although the Court refers on
occasions toMeroni, it is nevertheless fair to say that its position regarding the limitations of the
decision would greatly benefit from clarification.
108. See for references to Meroni, Commission, Impact assessment – accompanying
document to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, SEC(2010)678, pp. 13, 30
and 31; European Parliament (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs), Report on the
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
European Banking Authority (A7-0166/2010), p. 190; European Parliament (Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs), Report on the proposal for a directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC,
2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC
and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Banking Authority, the European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets
Authority (A7-0163/2010), pp. 14, 217–218, 222, 253, 264; European Parliament (Committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs), Report on the proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority
(A7-0169/2010), p. 134 (fn 1); European Parliament (Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs), Report on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (A7-0223/2011), p. 107.
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preparatory material,109 the EU legislature remains tight-lipped on justifying
its legislative choices in light of the relevant constitutional principles
governing a delegation of powers.To be sure, the question of the constitutional
limitations of a delegation was not ignored altogether in documents relating to
the proposals for vesting ESMAwith new powers.110 In its impact assessment
(IA) on the CRA-AR proposal,111 the Commission referred to Meroni when
discussing possible options for the establishment of a CRA sanctioning
regime and when proposing – albeit unsuccessfully – that it should be given
the power to decide on imposing sanctions. It is however apparent that the
Commission did not provide any detailed assessment and in any event the
assessment did not extend to powers other than the contemplated sanctioning
powers. This state of affairs led the Impact Assessment Board (IAB), which
evaluates and issues an opinion on the draft IAs that the Commission prepares,
to express some grievances. The IAB thus asked the Commission twice to
provide more details on the Meroni issues. In its first opinion, it noted:
“The report should give a fuller presentation of Meroni issues and explain
why they only arise with regards to sanctioning and not other powers that
might be delegated to ESMA (for instance, registration of CRAs and
power of inspection).”112
In its report on the revised draft IA, the IAB still concluded thatmore details
were needed.113 What is more, the outcome of the legislative process did not
provide new answers. The questions, which the IAB had raised in its opinions,
remained unanswered too. Yet, discussions on the legal limitations of a
delegation of powers to ESMA appear to have been conducted during the
legislative process, but behind closed doors. For example, the Council Legal
Service was asked to provide advice onwhether ESMA could be delegated the
109. Ibid.
110. The Commission has also produced a number of documents in which it develops its
views on a delegation of powers, although these reflections have taken place outside the context
of legislative proposals to vest powers in agencies. See e.g. Commission, Communication from
the Commission – the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies,
COM(2002)718 final; Commission, Draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating
framework for the European regulatory agencies, COM(2005)59 final. Note that the draft
agreement was not adopted.
111. See supra note 108, pp. 30 and 31.
112. Commission (ImpactAssessment Board), DGMarkt – impact assessment on: proposal
for amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (26 Feb. 2010), p. 2.
113. Commission (ImpactAssessment Board), DGMarkt – impact assessment on: proposal
for amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (20Apr. 2010), p. 2 noting inter
alia that the report should “explain whyMeroni concerns only arise with regards to sanctioning
and not other powers that might be delegated to ESMA (for instance, registration of CRAs and
power of inspection)”.
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power to decide itself whether to impose sanctions on CRAs.114 Indeed,
similar “behind-the-doors” discussions over the permissible scope of a
delegation continue being conducted as ESMA is allocated new powers.
During the negotiations of the Commission proposal for a regulation on OTC
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, questions were thus
raised with respect to whether ESMA could be delegated the power to
determine whether a class of derivative contracts should be deemed eligible
for a clearing obligation.115 At the time of writing, negotiations are still
ongoing. But the overall picture which emerges from these different
negotiations is that of a process which lacks openness and of a very ad hocway
of determining the limits of an allocation of powers to ESMA.
The legislature’s silence is arguably all the more disconcerting for two
reasons: first, because ESMA’s range of powers is considerable and growing;
second, because the interpretation of the Meroni limitations by policy actors
appears to be rather fluid. The Commission, for example, has taken the view
that Meroni does not prevent an agency from having “technical discretion”,
i.e., discretion that allows an agency to make judgments of a technical nature
in the area in which it operates.116 In its proposal for establishing a European
Aviation Safety Agency, the Commission thus noted:
“[t]he exercise of executive powers and the control of implementation of
rules and regulations is the prerogative of the Commission; such tasks
114. Public access to the advice is refused underArt. 4(2) of Regulation (EC)No 1049/2001
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. 2001, L 145/43. See Council
of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies – delegation of
the power to impose sanctions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 23
September 2010 (No 14010/10).
115. The Council Legal Service set out its confidential views in Council Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central
counterparties and trade repositories – delegation to ESMA of a power to decide on the
eligibility for clearing of classes of derivative contracts, 20 Dec. 2010 (No 18136/10), which is
only partially accessible.
116. Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation and creating a European Aviation
Safety Agency, COM(2000)595 final, p. 5; Commission, Communication from the
Commission – the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies, COM(2002)718
final, p. 8 (speaking of areas for intervention which “must allow the agencies the margin of
autonomy needed for their technical and scientific appraisals”). See also case T-187/06,
Schräder, [2008] ECR II-3151, paras. 60–63, in which the General Court, when determining
the scope of its judicial review, admitted that the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)
benefited from amargin of appreciationwith respect to complex botanical assessments, thereby
transposing to the CPVO, case law on Community authorities which are required to make
complex assessments of a technical or economic nature.
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may be delegated to another body only on the basis of rules limiting its
discretion to a technical judgment within its sphere of competence.”117
But in its impact assessment of the CRA-AR, it appears to go significantly
further in attempting to carve out a discretionary space for ESMA when
stating that
“clearly defined executive powers can be delegated to an agency including
powers, that involve the need to interpret Community law provisions to
determine their application andwhich leave the authority a certain margin
of appreciation in applying these rules.” (emphasis added)118
In attempting to make sense of differences in interpretation between EU
actors, a starting point is that readings are often likely to be intertwined with
political or institutional preferences for or against a delegation of powers to
agencies.119 Setting up agencies can impact on the distribution of
competences between actors and, as such, raise simple interest-based
considerations for them.120 The Commission thus referred toMeroni, and the
need to respect the institutional balance, when putting forward its proposals
for a CRA-AR.121 As already mentioned, the Commission argued, although
unsuccessfully, that it (rather than ESMA) should have the final say on fines
and penalty payments.122 Still, it would be mistaken to assume that within the
Commission, all services and departments are necessarily equally interested
in upholdingMeroni.123 As far as the Commission proposals on the ESAs are
concerned, anecdotal evidence suggests that DG Markt was less in favour of
Meroni than the Commission legal service which was among those that were
committed to upholding it. Moreover, the allocation of binding powers to the
117. Ibid., p. 5.
118. Commission, cited supra note 108, p. 13. Cf. also with Romano, cited supra note 92,
para 20.
119. See also Craig, op. cit. supra note 105, p. 162–164.
120. It has, e.g., been noted in the literature that the European Commission likes to embrace
Meroni because it fits its institutional preference for regulatory agencies with limited powers,
which allows it to protect its executive function (see ibid.).
121. Commission, Improving EU supervision of Credit RatingAgencies – frequently asked
questions, 3 June 2010, available at: <europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/10/230&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (last visited 10
July 2011), noting that “[t]he proposal has been developed in very close co-operation with the
Commission’s Legal Service in order tomake sure that it fully respects existing case law and the
institutional balance foreseen in the Treaty”. See also the Commission’s impact assessment on
the CRA-AR proposal, cited supra note 108, pp. 13, 30 and 31.
122. The reading ofMeroni that the Commission put forward would in fact have extended
its powers.
123. See also Craig, op. cit. supra note 105, p. 162 (noting that “[i]t may well be true…that
there are tensions within the Commission, with certain members wishing to move beyond
Meroni and create true regulatory agencies” (footnote omitted)).
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ESAs also raised issues amongMember States and therefore in the Council. It
is worth remembering that the establishment of agencies can have as a
consequence to “Europeanize”124 powers of national authorities. Given the
ensuing loss of competence for Member States,125 it is not surprising that the
Council had been unwilling to delegate legally binding powers to the ESAs’
predecessors, the so-called Lamfalussy Level 3 committees.126 To be sure,
later, Member States had a change of heart. The establishment of the ESAs in
2011 testify to this. But agreement was not reached without first putting in
place specific safeguards which are meant to protect the interests – the “fiscal
responsibility” – ofMember States.127Meronimeanwhile continues to be cited
by policy actors in the context of the discussions on ESMA’s powers.The UK,
for instance, appears only recently to have put forwardMeroni in support of its
position during the negotiations over the proposed regulation on short selling
and certain aspects of credit default swaps.128 The point is then that Member
States, just as much as the Commission, have something at stake in setting up
the ESAs. Also it appears that a number of strategies are used in order to deal
with the delegation of powers to agencies such as ESMA.These strategies are
worthy of closer examination.
3.3. Ex ante and ex post strategies for managing ESMA’s powers
When considering strategies which the EU legislature might envisage
adopting in order to manage an allocation of powers to ESMA (or the ESAs
generally), it is important to bear in mind that these strategies will generally
reflect a mixture of considerations. Legislative choices are the outcome of a
complex interplay of factors. Actor preferences and the institutional setting,
124. Dehousse, op. cit. supra note 96, p. 221.
125. See also Conac, op. cit. supra note 2, 501 (noting in relation toMember States that “[i]l
existe en effet une crainte que l’intégration conduise à une perte de souveraineté définitive et
potentiellement dommageable”).
126. The point was re-iterated during the 2007–2008 discussions on the Lamfalussy
process; e.g., 2836th ECOFINMeeting, 4 Dec. 2007, Press Release, No 15698/07 (Presse 270)
p 20, noting that the level-3 committees should “…explore the possibilities to strengthen the
national application of guidelines, recommendations and standards of Level 3 Committees,
without changing their legally non-binding nature”, the Council credo with respect to Level 3
committees being that progress should be made regarding the working of these committees
“…without unbalancing the current institutional structure…” (p. 17). See also Council of the
European Union (ECOFIN), The EU supervisory framework and financial stability
arrangements – Council conclusions, 15 May 2008 (No 8515/3/08 REV 3), pp. 3 and 4.
127. Art. 38 ESMA Reg.
128. House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 20th Report 2010-11, available
at: <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xviii/428xviii.pdf>
(last visited 15 July 2011), stating at p. 6 that “the Government’s aim has been to ensure that
powers given to the European Securities andMarketsAuthority go no further than agreed in the
regulatory and supervisory package, which created, inter alia, the authority, and that such
powers must be exercised legally in accordance with theMeroni principle” (footnote omitted).
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including constitutional rules and case law, all matter. The latter might define
strict and clear limitations that considerably constrain the choice of
arrangements that policy-makers can consider adopting. But rules and case
law might also be vaguer and open to interpretation, such as in the case of
Meroni, leaving policy actors greater freedom to insist on their preferred
readings. At any rate, within the permissible constitutional space, regulatory
choices will be driven by all sorts of factors which might have little to do with
legal considerations and more to do with making these choices politically
acceptable to Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament.
Bearing this in mind, it is possible to identify a number of ex ante and ex post
strategies which the legislature seems so far to have adopted in order to
manage the allocation of powers to ESMA.
Ex antemeasures structure the allocation of powers.Their aim is to limit the
discretion of ESMA by defining requirements or criteria according to which it
must make decisions.129 Arguably, these measures should meet a number of
conditions in order to ensure that there is no unacceptable exercise of policy
discretion. They should be clear and precise and state exhaustively the kind of
factors that ESMA must consider before making a decision. Optional
language (“may”, as opposed to “shall” or “must”) should be avoided. To
illustrate this type of strategy, it is worth turning to the CRA-R, as recently
amended by the CRA-AR. Recall that the CRA-R is the first sectoral act
which vested exclusive supervisory powers in ESMA, including the power to
impose financial sanctions. Based onMeroni, it is argued that it would not be
permissible to let ESMA have a genuine discretionary say in determining a
financial sanction (e.g. the amount of a fine), given that this power could be
used to pursue policy choices.130 It is apparent that the CRA-R seeks precisely
to prevent ESMA from having an inadmissible discretionary power over fines
and penalty payments.131 Thus, with respect to fines, the CRA-R specifies the
type of infringements that can be sanctioned, the maximum and minimum
amounts of the corresponding fine (the “basic amount of the fine”), and a
“two-step methodology”132 for setting the final amount of the fine.133 More
specifically, to determine the fine, ESMA must, according to the Regulation,
129. The nature of these requirements/criteria was one of the points under investigation in
Meroni. The Court referred to what it called “objective criteria” which contributed to ensuring
that the delegation did not involve discretionary powers (see Meroni, cited supra note 85, pp.
152–154).
130. Schammo, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 35. There is a separate issue here which is whether
the power to sanction market actors, by imposing fines for instance, is part of the powers which
the EU possesses in the internal market. I will return to the point hereinafter.
131. Hereinafter, I will focus on fines. But note that with respect to penalty payments, the
CRA-R also structures the delegation. See Art. 36b CRA-R for details.
132. Recital (18) CRA-AR.
133. Art. 36a, Annex III, Annex IV CRA-R.
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first determine the basic amount of a fine by considering the CRA’s annual
turnover in the previous year and by determining whether it is lower than EUR
10 million; between EUR 10–50 million; or greater than EUR 50 million.134
Based on these figures, the basic amount of the fine will be set at the lower,
middle or higher end of the amounts specified for each infringement.135 Next,
this basic amount must be adjusted in order to take account of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.136 For these purposes, the Regulation lays down
specific coefficients which in each case allowESMA to quantify the impact of
these circumstances.137
The two-step methodology that the Regulation implements with respect to
fines is reminiscent of the method that the Commission uses when setting
fines for breaches ofArticles 101 and 102TFEU (ex 81 and 82 EC) under the
Treaties’ rules on competition.138 Here too, the method consists in setting a
basic amount to which adjustments can be made because, for example, of the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.139 But in terms of discretion,
there are important differences between the Commission’s powers with
respect to infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and those of ESMA
under the CRA-R.140 The Commission’s power to impose fines is structured
by Council Regulation No 1/2003 which lays down a number of requirements
that the Commission must respect.141 But within the constraints set by the
Regulation, the Commission benefits nevertheless from a “wide margin of
discretion” in making use of its power to impose fines for infringements of
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.142 It is relevant to note in this context that the
Commission’s tasks in this field include not only the duty to impose sanctions
for individual breaches, but also “the duty to pursue a general policy designed
to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to
steer the conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles”.143 Thus, in
134. Art. 36a(2) CRA-R.
135. Ibid.
136. Art. 36a(3) CRA-R.
137. Annex IV.
138. See esp., Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to
Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, O.J. 2006, C 210/2.
139. Ibid., paras. 9–11.
140. See Wils’s analysis of the Commission’s discretion in antitrust enforcement in Wils,
“Discretion and prioritisation in public antitrust enforcement, in particular EU antitrust
enforcement” (2011), available at: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759207>
(last visited 15 July 2011).
141. O.J. 2003, L 1/1,Art. 23. Specifically,Art. 23(3) states that the Commission must have
regard “both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement” andArt. 23(2) determines a
limit which the fines cannot exceed.
142. Commission Guidelines, cited supra note 138, para 2.
143. Ibid., para 4. See also Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205 to 208 and 213/02 P, Dansk
Rørindustri and Others, [2005] ECR I-5425, para 170.
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exercising its power to fine market actors, the Commission also aims at
achieving deterrence.144 Moreover, unlike ESMA’s methodology which was
laid down by the EU legislature in a (binding) legislative act, the two-step
methodology that the Commission follows when imposing fines is found in
Commission guidelines. Although the adoption of these guidelines is not
without effects on the Commission’s discretion,145 the Court has noted
nonetheless that “the self-limitation on the Commission’s discretion arising
from the adoption of the Guidelines is not incompatible with the
Commission’s maintaining a substantial margin of discretion”.146 As already
mentioned, in ESMA’s case, the CRA-R seeks to prevent the exercise of
discretionary behaviour by circumscribing tightly (in a legally binding act)
ESMA’s powers to set fines. Indeed, besides specifying the methodology that
it must follow, various other factors contribute to this goal. For example, the
language used throughout the provisions on fines: words like “may” (as
opposed to “shall”) or “such as” (which would enable a delegatee to have a
greater degree of latitude) are markedly absent from the provisions on fining
in the amended CRA-R. On the other hand, such language is common in the
Commission’s guidelines on setting fines.147 Also, Regulation 1/2003 states
that the Commission “may” impose fines.148 In comparison, the CRA-R
provides that ESMA “shall” impose a fine in case of an infringement.149To be
sure, ESMA has still some latitude when determining the basic amount of a
fine within the limits set by the legislature. But after adjusting this amount
according to the requirements of the CRA-R, by reference to the annual
turnover of the CRA, the latitude left to ESMA is unlikely to have, in terms of
the orientations of a fining policy, any meaningful impact. Moreover, the EU
legislature also added a review clause – essentially, an ex postmeasure –which
grants the ECJ “unlimited jurisdiction” to review ESMA’s decisions on fines
144. Commission Guidelines, cited supra note 138, para 4; Joined Cases 100-103/80,
Musique Diffusion française and others, [1983] ECR 1825, para 106. See also para 30 of the
guidelines which provides for the Commission to increase a fine in order to achieve deterrence
(albeit within the statutory maximum set by Reg. 1/2003 (see paras. 32–33 of the Guidelines)).
145. Dansk Rørindustri, cited supra note 143, paras. 209–211, noting that general
principles such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectationsmust be respected
by the Commission.
146. Case T-116/04, Wieland-Werke AG, [2009] ECR II-1087, para 31. See also Wills, op.
cit. supra note 140, 20–21. See also the Editorial comments in 48 CML Rev. (2011), 1–12.
147. Commission Guidelines, cited supra note 138, paras. 22, 27, 28, 29, 35, 36. See also
para 37 which states that the Commission may depart from the method set out in the guidelines.
148. Art. 23 Council Regulation No 1/2003. See also Wills, op. cit. supra note 140, 19
noting that “…the Commission is never obliged to impose fines, even if the conditions allowing
it do so are fulfilled”.
149. Art. 36a(1) CRA-R.
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or penalty payments.150 Thus, the ECJ may also “annul, reduce or increase the
fine or periodic penalty payment imposed”.151
There are other ways in which an allocation of powers to ESMA is
managed. ESMA might simply be prohibited from taking policy
considerations into account. The provisions on RTS and ITS in the ESMA
Regulation illustrate the point, as they state that the standards “shall not imply
strategic decisions or policy choices…”.152 Other measures might restrict or
otherwise specify the scope of ESMA’s powers. As noted, the EU legislature
uses sectoral acts for this purpose. For instance, for ESMA to exercise its
dispute settlement powers underArticle 19 of the ESMA Regulation, sectoral
legislation must make provision for this.153 A first so-called “omnibus”
directive determined the first set of cases that qualify for dispute settlement.154
The EU legislature also relies on ex post measures. These measures come
into play once an agency has adopted a position on a given matter. They can
take different forms.155 Think of the Commission’s power to approve draft
RTS or ITS.156 Another example is found in the Regulation establishing the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) which provides for the
Commission, instead of the EASA, to impose fines and penalty payments
following a request of the EASA.157 When coming forward with its proposal
for a CRA-AR, the Commission proposed to adopt a similar approach.158 But,
as we have seen, the EU legislature adopted a different approach by letting
ESMA impose the fines and penalty payments, subject to various legislative
requirements which effectively ensure that ESMA does not have an
inadmissible discretionary say on the matter.
150. Art. 36e CRA-R.
151. Ibid.
152. Art. 10(1) sub-para (2), and Art. 15(1) ESMA Reg.
153. See also Recital (18) of Directive 2010/78/EU, O.J. 2010, L 331/120 which states that
“[t]he regulations establishing the ESA require that the cases where the mechanism to settle
disagreements between national competent authorities may be applied are to be specified in the
sectoral legislation”.
154. Ibid. UnderDirective 2010/78/EU, dispute settlement is envisaged formatters between
competent authorities that involve cooperation, coordination or joint decision-making. Art.
22(2) of Directive 2003/71/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/78/EU) states accordingly that
“[t]he competent authorities may refer to ESMA situations where a request for cooperation, in
particular to exchange information, has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a
reasonable time.… ESMA may, in the situations referred to in the first sentence, act in
accordance with the power conferred on it underArticle 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010″.
155. I have already mentioned earlier review clauses such as the one found in the CRA-R.
See supra note 150.
156. Arts. 10 and 15 ESMA Reg.
157. O.J. 2008, L 79/1, Art. 25(1).
158. COM(2010)289 final, Arts. 36a and 36b.
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4. Lifting the veil on the allocation of powers to ESMA
One of themessages of this paper concerns theway inwhich actors at EU level
allocate powers to ESMA. Specifically, it was argued that what was somewhat
unsettling is that, save for the odd mention ofMeroni in preparatory material,
policy actors remained mostly silent on when and how they saw the principles
governing the delegation of powers to outside bodies affect their legislative
choices regarding the allocation of binding powers to ESMA. Instead, we are
left with the task of joining the dots and guessing the intentions of the EU
legislature when examining the relevant provisions. This section seeks to
elaborate on a number of more specific issues that are currently left
unaddressed. It examines five of them: the first concerns the public interest
(4.1.); the second is about the nature of the powers that are delegated (4.2.); the
third concerns the vexed issue of discretion (4.3.); the fourth is about the fact
that the strategies which the legislature seems to adopt in order to manage the
powers of ESMA can be more or less constraining and consequently affect
ESMA’s discretion to different extents, which raises questions about the
reasons for this type of variation (4.4.); the fifth, finally, looks at the broader
context when turning to the Court’s decision in ENISA (4.5.).
4.1. Public interest
Traditionally, the Commission has taken the view that regulatory agencies
should only intervene in fields “where a single public interest
predominates”.159 Upon reflection, however, it is not apparent that the
description of agencies which act in fields “where a single public interest
predominates” is especially fitting in the case of ESMA. Indeed, in a field
such as securities regulation, choices regarding a particular course of action
are often the outcome of a balancing exercise between different types of
interests or policy considerations, e.g. investor protection or facilitating
access to financial markets.This complex interplay can also be reflected in the
objectives of sectoral legislation in whose implementation ESMA will
participate, or in the goals of competent authorities at Member State level.160
Indeed, competent authorities – i.e., the members of ESMA – can have fairly
different preferences for how to pursue a particular objective (e.g. retail
investor protection).161 Hence, the depiction of an agency which takes
159. COM(2002)718 final, cited supra note 110, p. 8; Commission, European Governance:
a White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, p. 24.
160. In the case of the FSA, see FSMA ss. 1(2) and 1(3) which set out the FSA’s objectives
and (secondary) principles of good regulation.
161. See also Schammo, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 54–57. Moloney has, for instance,
referred to differences which emerged during the negotiations of MiFID with regard to how
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decisions in an areawhere a single interest prevails or –more to the point in the
case of ESMA – that of an EU body with a mono-dimensional objective of
“protect[ing] the public interest by contributing to the short, medium and
long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system”,162 can just as
well be said to obscure a far more complex reality of competing interests and
considerations.
4.2. Nature of delegated powers
One particular pressing question concerns the nature of the powers that are
being allocated to ESMA. I will illustrate the point with the example of
ESMA’s power to impose financial sanctions, but arguably the point is
wider.163 Following the adoption of the CRA-AR, ESMA now possesses
exclusive supervisory powers over CRAs, including the power to impose
fines and penalty payments on them. In the CRA-AR, the legislature justified
the decision to grant ESMA such powers in light of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.164 With respect to the power to impose
financial sanctions, the Commission also referred in its preparatory material
briefly to Meroni and stated how it intended to make sure that the
contemplated provisions would comply with the case law.165 But actors at EU
level plainly ignored the questionwhich should have preceded the enquiry into
issues raised by the principle of subsidiarity: i.e. does the EU possess the
powers that it seeks to delegate? The power to sanction firms or individuals in
the internal market field is arguably different from other powers, in the sense
that it can be seen as more closely linked to statehood.166 It is generally a
matter for Member States and national authorities. It is relevant to note in this
context that the EU is based on the principle of conferral. It must act within the
limits of the competences vested in it by the Member States in the Treaties.167
Also, Meroni made it plain that a delegator could not delegate powers which
were different from its own powers. Admittedly, there are some cases where
powers to sanction individuals are vested in EU actors.168 For instance, we
retail investor protection should be pursued. SeeMoloney, “Building a retail investment culture
through law: the 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive”, 6 EBOR (2005), 341-421,
348.
162. Art. 1(5) ESMA Reg.
163. See also for first thoughts on the issues at stake: Schammo, op. cit. supra note 2, pp.
238–239; Moloney, Rules in action, op. cit. supra note 2, 219.
164. Recital (35) CRA-AR.
165. Impact assessment, cited supra note 108, p. 30–31.
166. See also more generally, Dashwood, “States in the European Union”, 23 EL Rev.
(1998), 201-216, 213 (noting that coercion is the “hallmark of statehood”).
167. Art. 5(2)TEU, stating further that “[c]ompetences not conferred upon the Union in the
Treaties remain with the Member States”. See also Art. 13(2) TEU.
168. E.g. Art. 103(2)(a) TFEU; Art. 215(2) TFEU (with respect to “restrictive measures”).
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have seen that the Commission has the power to fine and impose penalty
payments in competition matters.169 But these powers are foreseen in the
Treaties. Furthermore, the CRA-AR is based on Article 114 of the TFEU, an
internal market provision which serves a specific purpose: i.e. to adopt
measures for the approximation of national rules in order to contribute to
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.170 Hence, the
adoption of a regulation whose purpose is to vest an EU body with
sanctioning/supervisory powers over CRAs is not without causing some
concerns as to how it squares with basic EU constitutional principles.And yet,
there are reasons to suggest that the Court is unlikely to take a narrow view on
the matter. For one thing, it is clear that the Court can be inventive when
interpreting the provisions of the Treaties and that “post-Tobacco
Advertising”, it does not strike down a harmonization measure easily on the
grounds that the principle of conferral is infringed.171 It might well consider
that the CRA-AR makes a sufficient contribution to the objectives of Article
114TFEU.172Also, the Court has already held in relation to formerArticle 95
EC (114 TFEU), that the EU legislature had a discretion with respect to the
method of harmonization “most appropriate for achieving the desired result”
and that there was no reason to think that the addressees of the measures
adopted underArticle 95 EC had to be the individual Member States.173 To be
sure, until the Court rules, the matter will not be settled conclusively. But the
relevant point for the present purposes is that the question deserves to be
addressed, given that it has important implications for the division of
competences between Member States and the EU. This is all the more so as
subsidiarity is unlikely to present a significant hurdle for the EU legislature to
vest EU bodies with supervisory/sanctioning powers over market actors.
Traditionally, the Court has not policed subsidiarity vigorously.174
169. Art. 103(2)(a) TFEU.
170. In Tobacco Advertising the Court insisted that the harmonization measure “must
genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and
functioning of the internal market”. See Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council,
[2000] ECR I-8419 [84]. See also more recently, Case C-58/08, Vodafone, judgment of 8 June
2010, nyr, paras. 32–33.
171. See infra section 4.5.
172. E.g. the Court might argue along the lines of its ENISA decision which is examined
infra in section 4.5. As Fahey notes the Court’s reasoning in ENISA was especially broad with
regard to the threshold for resorting to Art. 114 TFEU. See Fahey, “Does the emperor have
financial crisis clothes? Reflections on the legal basis of the European BankingAuthority”, 74
MLR (2011), 581-595, 591.
173. Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council, [2006] ECR
I-03771, paras. 43–44; Case C-66/04,United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, [2005] ECR
I-10553, para 45.
174. Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, European Union Law, (Sweet & Maxwell 2011), pp.
139–140; Howells and Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (Ashgate, 2005) p. 133.
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4.3. Discretion
While there are differences between agencies, it appears that at least some of
them are not prevented from exercising technical discretion, i.e. a discretion
which allows agencies tomake judgments of a technical nature in their field of
expertise.175 Given that agencies are the repositories of technical expertise, it
would indeed be nonsensical to prevent them from making use of this expert
knowledge. Moreover, Meroni was concerned with policy discretion, i.e. the
exercise of discretion which allows a delegatee to pursue policy. Specifically,
Meroni sought to rule out a delegation of powers which, because of its wide
discretionary nature, could “make possible the execution of actual economic
policy” (“susceptible de traduire par l’usage qui en est fait une véritable
politique économique”).176 In the case in point, the Court deemed this possible
because of a lack of objective criteria whereby the delegatees could formulate
their decisions.177 Yet, if we take a closer look at the above distinction, it is
apparent that in practice there will be cases where it is likely to prove
problematic. Its practical implementation in the fields of activities of ESMA
might thus pose problems because a hard and fast distinction between
different forms of discretion may not exist or because in practice the notion of
technical discretion might simply serve to cast a veil over other types of
considerations that ESMA cannot openly disclose because of the restrictions
which are placed on the delegation.178We have yet to see howESMAwill steer
175. This appears to be the case of, for instance, the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) or the Office for Harmonization in the
Internal Market (OHIM). The term ‘technical discretion’ is used by the Commission (see e.g.
Commission proposal COM(2000)595 final, cited supra 116, p. 5). In Case C-40/03 P, Rica
Foods, [2005] ECR I-6811, paras. 45–46, A.G. Léger also spoke of “discretion of a ‘technical’
nature” (as opposed to “discretion of a ‘political’ nature”) in order to describe a form of
discretion that is justified by the complexity of, inter alia, technical situations. More relevant in
our context is the General Court’s decision in Schräder cited supra note 116, paras. 60–64 and
73, in which it admitted, when discussing the limits of its review that, an agency (the CPVO)
benefited from a margin of appreciation (or a broad margin of discretion) with regard to
complex technical assessments (i.e., botanical assessments). Note that there is no meaningful
difference between terms such as a “margin/power of appreciation” and “discretion” in the
Court’s case law. See Fritzsche, “Discretion, scope of judicial review and institutional balance
in European law”, 47 CML Rev. 2010, 361-403, 364.
176. Meroni, cited supra note 85, para 152.
177. Ibid. para 154.
178. See also Chamon, op. cit. supra note 32, 1070; Craig, op. cit. supra note 105, p. 184
(referring to arguments developed byGiandomenicoMajonewhen noting that “…it is not really
possible in certain areas, such as risk regulation, to distinguish between the technical issues
dealt with by an agency, and the policy matters residing in majoritarian institutions”);
Dehousse, op. cit. supra note 96, p. 223 noting that “many scientific decisions do involve
political dimensions” and talking about economic interests and political concerns “hid[ing]
behind pseudo-scientific arguments”.
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a course between these different forms of discretion – for example, when
preparing draft technical standards which, according to the ESMA
Regulation, “shall not imply strategic decisions or policy choices”.179 At the
time of writing, ESMA has yet to produce its first draft standards. But as a
general comment, in a field such as securities regulation, where investor
protection concerns must often be balanced against other considerations such
as the cost of regulation for market actors, there is arguably scope for overlap
between different forms of discretion.
4.4. Variation
As noted above, the EU legislature appears, for legal and/or political reasons,
to have used various strategies to manage an allocation of powers to ESMA.
These strategies can be more or less constraining and consequently affect
ESMA’s discretion to different extents. To illustrate the point, consider again
ESMA’s power to impose fines. Fining can be used as a policy instrument. It
is plain that ESMA’s powers were tightly circumscribed. The CRA-R (as
amended) lays down amethodology and criteria onwhich ESMAmust base its
fining decisions and thereby restricts ESMA from exercising an inadmissible
level of discretion. But fining is not the only instrument which can be used for
policy purposes. Licensing, for instance, can be too. Recall in this context that
ESMA is in charge of registering CRAs, a task which was previously vested in
national authorities. Its power to register them is circumscribed.180 ESMA
must decide on registration solely on the basis of the requirements which are
laid down in the CRA-R.181 According to Article 14(5), it cannot “impose
requirements regarding registration which are not provided for in this
Regulation”. But in comparison to the provisions that apply with respect to
fines, the CRA-R appears to structure ESMA’s registration powers more
loosely. For instance, Article 14(4) does not itself specifically identify the
conditions that have to be met. It merely states that the conditions are those
“for the issuing of credit ratings set out in this Regulation”,182 “taking into
consideration” Article 4 (“Use of credit ratings”) and Article 6
(“Independence and avoidance of conflicts of interests”). ForAmtenbrink and
De Haan, who write before the adoption of the CRA-AR, the fact that Article
14(4) does not identify the relevant conditions explicitly is not entirely
179. Arts. 10(1) and 15(1) ESMA Reg.
180. Note that even before the CRA-AR was adopted, various requirements sought to
restrict the discretion of Member State authorities (e.g.Art. 14(5) CRA-R, before amendment).
181. See Art. 14(4) and (5) CRA-R.
182. For Amtenbrink and De Haan, this suggests that the requirements of Title II (“Issuing
of credit ratings”) are meant to “form the basis of the assessment”. Amtenbrink and De Haan,
op. cit. supra note 62, 1931.
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satisfactory, not least because, according to the authors, not all of the
conditions that a CRA must satisfy are precise, “leaving room for
interpretation and disagreement…”.183
There are arguably other examples that suggest that there can be variation in
terms of the extent with which ESMA’s powers are circumscribed.184 Having
said this, I make these points with some hesitation, as it is difficult to draw
conclusions without an inside understanding of the operation of the CRA
regime, and without intending to claim that any of the requirements of the
CRA-R are inadequate. The point is simply that in comparison to the
requirements andmethodology laid down for fines, the requirements applying
in relation to other types of powers lead a priori to a less mechanical
decision-making process.185
4.5. The broader context: Relationship with other case law
The questions that we have asked so far are important not only because of the
immediate concerns that they raise, but also because governance through
agencies is likely to continue developing in the EU. The Court’s permissive
approach to the use of Article 114 TFEU is also likely to contribute to this
trend. ESMA, just as its sister agencies, was established on the basis ofArticle
114 TFEU. The EU legislature claimed competence on the grounds that:
“[t]he purpose and tasks of the Authority – assisting competent national
supervisory authorities in the consistent interpretation and application of
Union rules and contributing to financial stability necessary for financial
integration – are closely linked to the objectives of the Union acquis
concerning the internal market for financial services.”186
In drawing this conclusion, without having to justify how specific tasks
contributed to the approximation of laws within the meaning of Article 114
TFEU, the legislature sought to benefit from ENISA, a decision of the ECJ in
which it took a tolerant approach to the question of the establishment of EU
bodies on the basis of Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC).187 The Court confirmed
that Article 95 EC could be used for establishing a Community body which
183. Ibid.
184. See e.g.Art. 6(3) which allows ESMA to exempt a CRA from certain requirements, or
Art. 24 on supervisory measures.
185. See also the comments made by the Impact Assessment Board on the Commission’s
draft impact assessment accompanying its proposal for a CRA-AR (see supra text to notes 112
and 113). Possibly, variation has something to dowith the exercise of technical discretion and/or
a narrower reading of the scope of application of the Meroni decision.
186. Recital (17) ESMA Reg.
187. United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council, cited supra note 173.
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participates in the implementation of the harmonization process, “where, in
order to facilitate the uniform implementation and application of acts based on
that provision, the adoption of non-binding supporting and framework
measures seems appropriate” and provided that the tasks entrusted to such a
body were “closely linked to the subject-matter of the acts approximating the
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States”.188
More specifically, it considered that the lawful application of Article 95 EC
presupposed that (i) the objectives and tasks of ENISAwere “closely linked to
the subject-matter” of the Community legislation in question and (ii) its
objectives and tasks “support[ed] and provid[ed] a framework for the
implementation of that legislation”.189 The Court’s review of this second
requirement was not, however, especially vigorous.190 Instead of examining
ENISA’s tasks in detail, it pointed to the fact that the Regulation establishing
ENISA was not an “isolated measure” but was part of a “normative context”
which aimed at securing market integration in the field of electronic
communications.191 Moreover, the Court noted that the area in question was
one in which the technology was “not only complex but also developing
rapidly”.192 It disagreed with the recommendations of Advocate General
Kokott who, given the tasks of ENISA, had come to the conclusion that the
“potential contributions of ENISA” were insufficient for its establishment to
be considered a harmonization measure within the meaning of Article 95
EC.193 For Kokott, this was so because it was simply not foreseeable if and in
what manner the agency would participate in harmonization.194 Interestingly,
in reaching its conclusion, the Court also took account of the fact that ENISA
was set up for a limited period of time and that the Regulation setting up
ENISA included a review clause under which the Commission is required to
carry out an evaluation of the agency.195 In short, for the present purposes,
ENISA was yet another decision in which the Court did not police the use of
Article 114 TFEU with much vigour.196 The days of Tobacco Advertising, in
188. Ibid., paras. 44–45.
189. Ibid., paras. 46–47.
190. Ibid., paras. 59–67.
191. Ibid., para 60.
192. Ibid., para 61.
193. Opinion of the A..G., para 33.
194. Ibid. para 34.
195. ENISA, cited supra note 187, para 65.
196. See in this context Weatherill, “The limits of legislative harmonization ten years after
Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s case law has become a ‘drafting guide’”, 12 German
Law Journal (2011), 827–864. See also Wyatt, “Community competence to regulate the
internal market” in Dougan and Currie (Eds.), 50Years of the EuropeanTreaties: Looking Back
and Thinking Forward (Hart Publishing, 2009), pp. 93–136.
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which the Court was willing to show more zeal, appear to have long gone.197
Arguably, it also makes it more pressing to lift the veil on the delegation of
powers to agencies.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine the allocation of powers to ESMA. It
paid particular attention to the CRA-AR as the first sectoral act which vests
day-to-day supervisory powers in ESMA. It also assessed delegation issues
and the Court’s decision inMeroni. It argued that the coremessages ofMeroni
continue to be relevant for the delegation of powers to EU bodies. In the same
breath, it submitted that the current state of affairs, which allows policy actors
to remain tight-lipped on how they see the principles governing a delegation of
powers affect the allocation of powers to ESMA, is not satisfactory and should
be addressed.
Undoubtedly, the delegation of powers raises difficult legal questions under
the EU’s institutional setting. But the current lack of frankness is bound to
raise concerns and doubts in the minds of interested parties. It risks
undermining the legitimacy of ESMA’s actions and ultimately makes them
vulnerable to legal challenges. It is worth drawing a parallel with the Court’s
reasoning on the EU’s policy on access to documents. When considering
whether greater disclosure (in the form of the disclosure of internal
Commission documents) could have detrimental effects by creating doubts
about the lawfulness of a decision, the Court noted:
“[i]t is in fact…a lack of information and debatewhich is capable of giving
rise to doubts in theminds of citizens, not only as regards the lawfulness of
an isolated act, but also as regards the legitimacy of the decision-making
process as a whole.”198
Moreover, for the Court, any risk that doubts might arise in the minds of EU
citizenswith respect to the lawfulness of an act “wouldmore often than not fail
to arise if the statement of reasons for that act were reinforced”.199 It is
submitted that the EU legislature should seek inspiration in this message of
197. Germany v. Parliament and Council, cited supra note 170. See for a fuller analysis,
Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 196.
198. Case C-506/08 P, Sweden v.MyTravel Group, judgment of 21 July 2011, nyr, para 113;
Joined Cases C-39/05 & 52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v. Council, [2008] ECR I-4723, para 59.
199. MyTravel Group, ibid., para 114; Sweden andTurco, ibid., para 60. The Court referred
to the case where such risks might be thought to arise because the document disclosed is an
unfavourable legal opinion.
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openness when faced with difficult questions over the delegation of powers.
Thus, by way of conclusion, it is submitted that EU actors should, in a spirit of
good governance and better regulation, be upfront about justifying
compliance with (or, as the case may be, the non-applicability of) the relevant
principles and case law. Moreover, they should pay due attention to the issues
discussed above: the question of the nature of the delegated powers; the issues
of discretion, variation and public interest.
To improve the state of affairs, one could envisage extending to delegation
issues, inter alia, existing arrangements which were adopted in the context of
the EU’s better regulation agenda, including those adopted in relation to the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the inter-institutional
agreement on better law-making.200 Seeking inspiration in subsidiarity
arrangements can be partly explained by the fact that the delegation of powers
to ESMA (and indeed the ESAs) has to some extent a similar sensitivity, given
that the ESAs Europeanize powers which were previously in the hands of
competent authorities. To be sure, this paper does not suggest that governance
through agencies has no merit. Nor does it seek to participate in debates on
whether ESMA will be able to exercise its powers effectively under current
constitutional constraints. In fact, it takes no sides in these debates. It simply
notes that any normative preference for agencies is not a reason for
sidestepping essential constitutional questions during the lawmaking process.
In addition, before suggesting, as some scholars do, that Meroni should be
abandoned, more detailed consideration should be given to the implications of
such a decision.201
200. See also the provisions (esp. Art 5) of Protocol (No 2) on the application of the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionalitywhich is annexed to theTEU andTFEU,O.J. 2010,
C 83/206. One could imagine that, as in the case of subsidiarity and proportionality, the
assessment of delegation issues be first (and systematically) carried out in the pre-legislative
phase. Thus, verifying compliance could become an essential part of the Commission’s impact
assessment process (see also the Feb. 2010 opinion of the Impact Assessment Board on the
CRA-AR proposal, (cited supra note 112, p. 2), noting that “…the report should regard
compatibility withMeroni as an additional objective…”).When putting forward its proposal to
grant the ESAs powers, the Commission could draw on this assessment and explain in its
explanatory memorandum how they are justified in light of these principles (cf. European
Parliament, Council, Commission, Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, O.J.
2003, C 321/1, para 15 (with respect to subsidiarity and proportionality)). Any significant
amendment would be duly re-assessed in this light, for instance, by way of a new impact
assessment (cf. ibid., para 30). At the outcome of the legislative process, the EU legislature’s
conclusions could materialize in a statement, which allows verifying compliance with the rules
and principles governing a delegation of powers, in the recitals of the legislative text.
201. Craig, op. cit. supra note 105, pp. 183–190 provides a starting point. Inspiration could
also be found in Menon andWeatherill, “Transnational legitimacy in a globalizing world: How
the European Union rescues its states”, 31 West European Politics (2008), 397–416.
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The final words are for the EU’s institutions. The European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission share responsibility for better regulation.202
They have committed themselves to respecting legal certainty and have agreed
to encourage “simplicity, clarity and consistency in the drafting of laws and
the utmost transparency of the legislative process”.203 It is time for them to
implement these principles in the context of the ESAs.
202. The point was also made by the European Court of Auditors in its report on impact
assessments. See European Court of Auditors, “Impact assessments in the EU institutions: Do
they support decision-making?” (2010), p. 6 (noting that “[b]etter Regulation is a responsibility
of all EU institutions involved in the legislative process”).
203. Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, cited supra note 200, para 2.
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